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cohesion 1COHESION, GENE FLOW, AND THE NATURE OF SPECIES*Since the Modern Synthesis, the view that species are cohesiveentities held together by gene flow has moved from being a the-oretical insight amongst systematists to common knowledge
amongst biologists. The plant biologist Vern Grant provides a classic
and succinct expression of this view, hereafter simply The View, in saying
that “species populations are homogenized and integrated by gene
flow.”1 As one of us has recently detailed, several biologists have chal-
lenged the empirical adequacy of The View over the past forty odd
years.2 Nevertheless, most biologists, including many phylogeneticists,
have thought that species are cohesive entities, and the idea that gene
flow is the primary cause of this cohesion continues to hold sway.3
The View offers a certain kind of explanatory cascade, which we
articulate in the next section. Largely unrecognized by both critics* The authors would like to thank audiences at the 2006 meetings of the Western
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in Vancouver, for their constructive feedback on earlier versions of this paper and re-
lated work, as well as the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
for financial support. For important comments, the first author is grateful to John Basl,
Malcolm Forster, Rémy Petit, Alex Rueger, Larry Shapiro, Joel Velasco and members of
the DC History and Philosophy of Biology reading group. The second author would like
to acknowledge the work of Allison Dawe as a research assistant in the mid-1990s, which
first got him puzzled about the topic of the paper. Both authors thank Ingo Brigandt
and Elliott Sober for written comments that have led to improvements.
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the journal of philosophy2and advocates of The View is a set of conceptual problems facing this
explanatory cascade, problems that originate in often unexamined
and shorthand talk of “gene flow” and “species cohesion.” These prob-
lems become apparent once one draws a distinction between two
kinds of cohesion. We view these problems as sufficiently serious to
reject The View. Given the wide acceptance of the view within both
the biological sciences and the philosophy of biology, this critique,
if successful, is significant in itself. But it also provides a new perspec-
tive on at least four issues concerning species, each of which we will
discuss in conclusion: (a) the study of species and evolutionary forces,
(b) the taxonomically central yet notoriously vague notion of evolu-
tionary unit, (c) related ontological claims about species individuality,
and (d) pluralism about species concepts.
i. species cohesion and gene flow
Many biologists think species are distinctively cohesive entities that
are marked off, in this respect, from other Linnaean taxa, such as
genera or families. The View offers a causal explanation of this cohe-
sion, and of the distinctive ontological status of species. Its essential
posit is that gene flow explains species cohesion because gene flow
is the primary cause of species cohesion.
The evolutionary genomicists Carrie Morjan and Loren Rieseberg
have recently elaborated this view in typical fashion: “The traditional
view is that species evolve as cohesive units held together by gene flow,
which acts to prevent populations from differentiating through local
adaptation or genetic drift.”4 Gene flow is thought to be the primary
preventer of such population differentiation largely in virtue of trans-
mitting the crucial causes of development: genes. By spreading adap-
tive genes or washing out the effects of maladaptive ones, gene flow
promotes phenotypic similarity among conspecifics. Consequently,
conspecific organisms manifest a sort of evolutionary unity or cohe-
sion as they trace a distinct trajectory through the space of evolution-
ary pressures, including selection and drift. As the ornithologist and
systematist Ernst Mayr put it earlier, “[t]he stabilizing effect of gene
flow is best documented by phenotypic uniformity,” such that “[t]he
steady and high genetic input caused by gene flow is the main factor
responsible for cohesion among the populations of a species.”54 Morjan and Rieseberg, “How Species Evolve Collectively: Implications of Gene Flow
and Selection for the Spread of Advantageous Alleles,” Molecular Ecology, xiii (2004):
1341–56.
5Mayr, Animal Species and Evolution (Cambridge: Harvard, 1963), pp. 521–22.
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cohesion 3Most biologists understand gene flow essentially to involve transmis-
sion of genes from one population to another. Measures of migration
from one population to another are then sometimes said to be gene
flow. But when careful, authors note that migration measures are in-
direct indicators of gene flow.6 Migration of individuals (or simply of
genetic material) from one population to another is necessary for
gene flow, but not sufficient. Such migration must also leave a lasting
phenotypic or genotypic footprint in the new population, modifying
the population’s trait frequencies. This is because the very point of
talking of gene flow is to explain the process whereby populations
(paradigmatically, within a species) come to resemble one another
and to distinguish themselves from others.7
A further clarification is that although gene flow is defined inter-
populationally, it typically occurs partly in virtue of, and thus implies,
a more basic form of gene flow, one that occurs within populations as
well. This is the intergenerational transmission of genes, from parent
to offspring. Population biologists seldom focus on this more basic
gene transmission. But species theorists rest at least implicitly on it
when advancing The View. For multiple groups of organisms to mani-
fest species cohesion, it is not sufficient that gene flow connects each
group serially or even in more reticulate fashion. Each group must
also itself be cohesive. And in implying that each group is cohesive
in any putative case of species cohesion by gene flow, the advocate
of The View appeals to more basic intergenerational gene transmis-
sion. Because this transmission is mediated by gene replication pro-
cesses, token genes do not literally flow from one population to and
through other populations, nor through generations, but copies do.
For this reason, except in special cases, such as some cases of lateral
gene transfer, the frequently used term “genetic exchange” can be
misleading when used as a gloss on gene flow.
We can now offer a concise expression of The View that reveals the
core of its explanatory structure. Species are cohesive entities in virtue
of a common evolutionary trajectory that their members share be-
cause of the similarities they possess with respect to their underlying
phenotypic and genotypic properties. These similar or shared proper-
ties exist within a given species because there is gene flow between its6 For two examples of such care, see Joseph E. Neigel, “A Comparison of Alternative
Strategies for Estimating Gene Flow from Genetic Markers,” Annual Review of Ecology
and Systematics, xxviii (1997): 105–28; Michael E. Hellberg, Ronald S. Burton, Neigel,
and Stephen R. Palumbi, “Genetic Assessment of Connectivity Among Marine Popula-
tions,” Bulletin of Marine Science, lxx (Supp. Vol.) (2002): 273–90.
7 See Peter J. Beurton, “How is a Species Kept Together?,” Biology & Philosophy,
x (1995): 181–96.
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the journal of philosophy4populations, the effects of which spread within those populations by
intergenerational gene transmission. Gene flow thus triggers the fol-
lowing causal and explanatory cascade:Gene flow within a species thus makes that species an integrated
whole, a closed gene pool within which genes flow but beyond which
they do not, a unit whose parts have shared characteristics and that
face evolutionary pressures as one.
To raise problems for this picture, let us now explore a distinction
between types of cohesion.
ii. two types of cohesion8
To say that species members share a common evolutionary trajectory
in virtue of sharing underlying phenotypic and genotypic properties is
to attribute what we call response cohesion to species. This is the prop-
erty an entity has when its components respond (or are disposed to
respond) as a unit to some kind of intervention. When the cells on my
skin respond to a long day in the hot Australian sun by turning first
brown and then red, they show response cohesion. For an entity to
have response cohesion there need not be any significant or relevant
causal interaction between its component parts. For example, individ-
uals who have the electricity cut to their neighborhood could all re-
spond in the same way (for example, lighting candles, calling the
electricity company), and their response as a whole could be causally
responsible for bringing about certain effects (for example, the restora-
tion of power). The neighborhood would then display response cohe-
sion, independent of any causal interaction between the individuals in it.
By contrast, an entity has integrative cohesion just if there are causal
interactions between many or all of its components that facilitate their
causal unification into a whole. Although an organism’s skin cells
can have response cohesion (as in the sunburn example), they also
possess this further form of cohesion, as do many parts of the body.Gene flow
High levels of genotypic 
and phenotypic similarity
Evolutionary trajectories 
largely shared
Species 
cohesion
Figure 1: Species Cohesion by Gene Flow8 Compare the distinctions briefly drawn by Brent Mishler and Robert Brandon,
“Individuality, Pluralism, and the Phylogenetic Species Concept,” Biology & Philosophy,
ii (1987): 397–414, and by Marc Ereshefsky “Discussion: Axiomatics and Individuality:
A Reply to Williams’ ‘Species are Individuals’,” Philosophy of Science, lv (1988): 427–34.
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cohesion 5Bodies are made up, in part, of functional systems, such as the diges-
tive and respiratory systems, and the causal interactions between the
components of such systems—from organs right through to cells and
their components—often result in higher levels of integration and
unity. It is such unity and integration, so caused, that we mean by
“integrative cohesion.”
Groups of individuals can also possess integrative cohesion. For
example, were the individuals in the neighborhood in the previous
example to meet, communicate, and make plans together that they
then jointly enacted (for example, to protest against the electricity
company in some way), they would manifest integrative cohesion.
The mechanisms underpinning this instance of integrative cohesion
would be linguistic, social, and cultural in nature; in the case of the
functional systems in an individual’s body, they are anatomical and
physiological. But as the first iteration of the neighborhood example
showed, an entity can have response cohesion without integrative
cohesion. Conversely, it can have integrative cohesion without related
response cohesion. My bodily systems form a whole with integrative
cohesion, as we noted, but the distinct functional natures of these sys-
tems do not always produce a uniform response to interventions, such
as a temperature increase.
Even short of the more exhaustive exploration of this distinction
that could be given, advocates of The View clearly imply that species
often have integrative cohesion, not just response cohesion. As we
have seen Grant express The View, “species populations are homoge-
nized and integrated by gene flow” (op. cit., our emphasis). When
Mayr says that “species have a reality and an internal genetic cohesion
owing to the historically evolved genetic program that is shared by all
members of the species,” invoking the common metaphor of a species
as a “protected gene pool,” he is again appealing to what we are call-
ing integrative cohesion.9 Ed Wiley and Daniel Brooks clearly have in-
tegrative cohesion, not (or not just) response cohesion, in mind when
they claim that “[w]e may view the actual reproductive interactions
within a species as a linkage pattern or network.”10 Likewise, so does
Michael Ghiselin when he writes that “[e]volution is possible at the
population level. But we need to restrict ourselves to a particular kind
of population, namely a whole integrated by sexual reproduction.”119 Mayr, Populations, Species, and Evolution (Cambridge: Harvard, 1970). The quota-
tions are from p. 12 and p. 13, respectively.
10Wiley and Brooks, op. cit., at p. 6.
11 Ghieslin, “Species Concepts, Individuality, and Objectivity,” Biology & Philosophy,
ii (1987): 127–43, at p. 136.
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the journal of philosophy6And David Hull carefully notes that the idea is that species have the
same kind of integration as organisms: “Most organisms do exhibit
more internal organization than most species, but this difference is
one of degree, not kind.”12
In light of this discussion, we could redraw Figure 1 as follows to
clarify what The View says in terms of the distinction between integra-
tive and response cohesion:All this suggests that proponents of The View are committed to
two claims:
(1) The phenomenon that stands in need of explanation is integrative
species cohesion.
(2) What explains integrative species cohesion, ultimately, is gene flow via
its causal influence on the response cohesion of the species population.
We shall argue next that both of these claims are false.
iii. integrative cohesion and problems for the
view’s explanandum
Consider two related problems with (1). The first of these stems from
what is present between most conspecific populations and organisms:
gaps. Species are typically made up of multiple and diffusely scattered
populations that are separated by geographical (for example, moun-
tains, oceans), climatic (for example, recurrent winds, temperature
differences), behavioral (for example, preferences for local mating
grounds) and ecological (for example, locale-specific niche differ-
ences) barriers. This marks a contrast between the vast majority of
species and the neighborhood example, as well as more commonplace
examples of integratively cohesive entities (for example, ordinary
physical objects). As the above neighborhood example implies, groups
of individuals can have integrative cohesion, but the gappiness of a typi-
cal species will preclude its being “group enough” to have that property.
The second and deeper problem for (1) stems from what is absent
between conspecific populations and organisms: the appropriateGene flow
High levels of genotypic 
and phenotypic similarity
Response cohesion 
at the species level
Integrative cohesion 
at the species level
Figure 2: Integrative Species Cohesion by Gene Flow12 Hull, “On the Plurality of Species: Questioning the Party Line,” in Robert A.
Wilson, ed., Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays (Cambridge: MIT, 1999), pp. 23–38, at p. 32.
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cohesion 7causal relations between parts. When an entity has integrative cohe-
sion there are certain kinds of causal relations between the parts of
that entity that, in part, explain its behavior or the effects brought
about through its agency. This is what makes such entities integrated,
as opposed to being simply cohesive: the cohesion of the whole is a
function of the causal (or other) relations between the parts. The sec-
ond problem is that conspecific populations do not bear these sorts of
relations to one another. It is not just that the relations are there but
are too weak to generate integrative cohesion. Rather, the gappiness
typical of species—their organism and population “parts” being sepa-
rated by mountains, oceans, currents, niche and behavioral differ-
ences, and so on—prevents even serial causal interactions between
most or all species members. Since it is just such causal interactions
between most or all species members that would make for integrative
cohesion, species typically lack integrative cohesion.
Gappiness itself need not preclude the sorts of interactions re-
quired for integrative cohesion. Consider that the U.S.A. is similarly
gappy (with many spatiotemporal obstacles between Alaska, Hawaii,
and the lower forty-eight states), but relevant integrating relations be-
tween its parts still exist. Whether gappiness dampens or even pre-
cludes integration is a contingent matter. But as biologists now know,
the behavioral and ecological traits of organisms in many species en-
sure that evenmodest intraspecific gaps are sufficient to preclude gene
flow between conspecific populations (Barker, op. cit.). Hence the sec-
ond problem for (1): that species are not integratively cohesive.
A natural response here is to think that these objections rest on too
ham-fisted an interpretation of species cohesion, one that attributes to
The View the claim that species are cohesive in just the sense in which
(say) a solid material object, or a socially active neighborhood, is co-
hesive. Surely there is a broader, or perhaps weakened, sense in which
species are integratively cohesive, it might be suggested. Yet the bur-
den of proof is clearly on a proponent of The View to make out this
response by moving beyond loose talk of species cohesion, while
heeding the distinction between response and integrative cohesion.
However, attempts to do this face a dilemma, depending on just how
one moves from integrative cohesion as we have defined it. One could
move quite radically, in effect seeking to rearticulate The View solely in
terms of response cohesion. Or one might attempt to soften or weaken
the notion of integrative cohesion itself. We will argue that versions of
The View revamped in either of these ways are not defensible, at least
not as versions of The View.
Suppose that one took the explanandum of The View to be response
cohesion, that is, in this context, largely shared evolutionary trajectories.Master Proof JOP 405
the journal of philosophy8This is indeed consistent with many of the claims that biologists make
about species when not explicitly discussing or defending The View. An
example is Alan Templeton’s “fundamental assumption” that it is best
to study species cohesion by “examining the evolutionary forces oper-
ating on individuals within populations or subpopulations and tracing
their effects upward until they ultimately cause all of the members of
that population or subpopulation to acquire phenotypic attributes
conferring species status on the group.”13 However, reducing species
cohesion to response cohesion substantially alters The View as it is ex-
plicitly defended and deployed, as can be seen by glancing back to the
quotations we have provided from Grant, Mayr, Morjan and Rieseberg,
Ghiselin, Hull, and Wiley and Brooks. It also leaves The View little if
any reason for distinguishing gene flow from other possible explanantia
of species cohesion, as we shall see in more detail in the next section.
To take the other horn of the dilemma, consider a weakened form
of integrative cohesion that begins by noting that parts of a lineage
stand in a diachronic, serial relation in which gene flow through
the lineage plays an integrating role over time. It does this insofar
as it generates genotypic and phenotypic similarity, and thereby pro-
motes shared evolutionary trajectories among the lineage parts. So
genes need only flow during enough brief intervals in the temporally
extended entity that constitutes the species to generate and maintain
this integration. Spatiotemporal unity is not required for integrative
cohesion, so understood (and so the first problem is avoided); and
relations like gene flow need not be constant and all-pervasive in order
to generate this kind of integrative cohesion (and so the second prob-
lem is avoided).
It may be that, with further conceptual work, an appropriately
weakened notion of integrative cohesion can be articulated along
these lines in service of The View. But we have two grounds for doubt.
The first is that integrative cohesion weakened in this way is likely to
be a property that is also shared by higher taxa. Given that all (or
many) species descend from a common ancestor, and that this is cer-
tainly true for species within a clade, there has been some kind of gene
flow, traced backwards in time, between populations of distinct species.
If species have weakened integrative cohesion due to such gene flow,
then so too do many higher taxonomic ranks. Indeed, emergence
of new taxa and cases of interspecific hybridization ensure many
populations of distinct species are more recently and/or frequently13 Templeton, “The Meaning of Species and Speciation: A Genetic Perspective,” in
David Otte and John A. Endler, eds., Speciation and Its Consequences (Sunderland, MA:
Sinauer, 1989), pp. ??–??; reprinted in Ereshefsky, ed., op. cit., pp. 159–83, at p. 159.
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cohesion 9connected by gene flow than are many conspecific populations. If we
keep in mind that The View has typically purported to identify integra-
tive cohesion as a distinctive feature of species amongst other tax-
onomic ranks, then the weakening considered here grinds against
the broader picture of species painted by The View.
The second is that, unlike the general characterization of integrative
cohesion that we have provided, this weakened form of it characterizes
that notion in terms of gene flow. But then integrative cohesion cannot
be explained by gene flow, because the two are not distinct. Unless
there is an articulation of this weakened form of integrative species
cohesion that is independent of the appeal to gene flow, The View
will suffer from a version of the classic problem identified by Molière
in his satirical jibe at contemporary medicine’s appeal to the dormitive
powers of sleeping potions as an explanation of why such potions put
one to sleep.14
While we have not tried to show that there is no notion of species
cohesion fit for the job required by The View, we have argued that (a)
species are not integratively cohesive (as we define it), and (b) attempts
to respond to this claim by arguing that species are cohesive in some
other sense face an initial dilemma, both horns of which are sharp.
(1), which articulates the explanandum of The View, should be rejected.
iv. response cohesion and problems for the view’s explanans
Consider now (2), the idea that gene flow ultimately explains a spe-
cies’ integrative cohesion via its causal influence on the response co-
hesion of its populations. There are problems for (2) that concern the
putative causal influence of gene flow on the response cohesion of
species, and so we can consider them independently of the above-
mentioned problems with the putative integrative cohesion of species.
As a preliminary, consider for a moment not gene flow, but simply
genes. At least part of the appeal of the very first stage in the causal
model postulated in The View (and depicted in Figures 1 and 2) is the
idea that genes are causes of phenotypical characters, and so geno-
types of phenotypes. Genes are uncontroversially such causes in the14 Could one respond here by claiming that gene flow realizes and thereby explains
weak forms of integrative cohesion in species, in something like the way salt’s micro-
structure putatively realizes and thereby explains its solubility? We think not. Gene flow
explains species cohesion and evolutionary trajectories of species to the extent that
it causes the conspecific similarities that underwrite trajectory sharing. If while doing
this gene flow also realizes a weak form of integrative cohesion in species, this seems
explanatorily irrelevant next to its role in causing conspecific similarity: the realized
weak integrative cohesion would be epiphenomenal with respect to the phenomena
of interest.
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the journal of philosophy10sense that they are a cause of phenotypic expression. Yet it is much
more controversial whether they are some kind of privileged or unique
such cause that marks them out either developmentally or evolution-
arily.15 This familiar debate parallels a debate concerning the role of
gene flow in generating genotypic and phenotypic similarity.
The core problem with (2) is that, upon clarifying the concept of
species cohesion, there seems no justification for discriminating
against other causes of a species’ response cohesion in the way that
(2) does. While gene flow can cause genotypic and phenotypic simi-
larity in populations, it is seldom if ever such a cause in and of itself.
As population biologists have only begun in recent years to thor-
oughly appreciate, developmental homeostasis, ecological regimes,
various types of canalization, mutation, history, and the various forms
that natural selection takes are also such causes. These factors play
both contributory and counter-balancing roles to the causal role that
gene flow plays in establishing and maintaining species cohesion. The
line of reasoning encapsulated in Figures 1 and 2, however, implies
that gene flow, like the gene itself, is a privileged cause or “main fac-
tor” (as we saw it put by Mayr) in the dynamic process that produces
and sustains species cohesion. The question is whether there is some
defensible basis for so identifying gene flow. Empirical and concep-
tual considerations suggest there is not. To see this, first consider
two recent discussions by biologists that appeal to alternative or addi-
tional causes of response cohesion.
In a paper on the “implications of gene flow and selection” for
“how species evolve collectively” that we have already drawn on,
Morjan and Rieseberg (op. cit., p. 1341) imply that natural selection
is often an important cause of response cohesion in species. They
focus specifically on how “interactions of gene flow with selection”
(ibid., p. 1342) can generate or sustain such cohesion. For example,
when there is strong “selection for globally advantageous mutations,”
selection “controls the rate of spread of advantageous alleles” (ibid.,
p. 1342); these mutations can spread rapidly across populations,
and so they and the selective forces that promote them “allow species
to evolve as a cohesive unit, even for those populations connected
with very low levels of gene flow” (ibid., p. 1342). Indeed, in such cases
there is a sense in which low levels of gene flow, and selection, and
mutations seem crucial causal factors of species cohesion. Traditional
population genetic theory often overlooks such cases because it tends15 Susan Oyama, Paul Griffiths, and R. Gray, eds., Cycles of Contingency: Developmental
Systems and Evolution. (Cambridge: MIT, 2001).
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cohesion 11to focus on “weakly selected mutations” (ibid., p. 1343), rather than
strongly selected ones. But Morjan and Rieseberg point out that this
“contrasts with the wealth of empirical evidence” (ibid., p. 1343) for
adaptation by strong selection. And they note that at least some well-
known models of population dynamics suggest that “the strength of
selection has a far greater effect on the rate of spread of advantageous
mutations across subdivided populations” than does gene flow (ibid.,
p. 1342).16 Although Morjan and Rieseberg are proponents of The
View and intend their article to show the efficacy of even low rates
of gene flow, ironically their argument for this conclusion demon-
strates the power that selection, in concert with other factors such
as gene flow, has in generating response cohesion in species.
The Hellberg group’s review of “connectivity among marine popu-
lations” (op. cit., p. 273) helpfully discusses alternative causes of spe-
cies cohesion. As with Morjan and Rieseberg, these authors emphasize
that “[s]elective sweeps…or stabilizing selection (where the same se-
lected genotypes are favored over a wide range) could enforce homo-
geneity,” and that, as a result, it can be misleading to presume that
homogeneity implies significant gene flow (ibid., p. 276). But the
authors emphasize other factors as well, including mutation, drift,
and history (ibid., pp. 275–77). Consider history. Recolonizing popu-
lations take up a location in which the previous local population went
extinct, and they tend to be genetically similar to their parent popula-
tion. This similarity is often retained when there is little gene flow into
or out of the recolonizing population after recolonization. Hellberg
and his colleagues note that this similarity can be “misleading” (ibid.,
p. 277) in cases where selection plays a significant role in maintaining
similarity over time. As they put it, “species with limited dispersal po-
tential will carry the mark of history for a longer period of time than
broad dispersers. Consequently, genetic approaches will tend to over-
estimate gene flow between recolonized populations and their
sources” (ibid., p. 277). In short, certain types of historical events
can be significant causes of response cohesion in species, and current
methods can miss this because they are associated with a theory that
presumes gene flow is the primary cause.
Given causes of response cohesion other than gene flow, how can a
proponent of The View identify gene flow as causally, and so explana-16 For examples of the well-known models of population genetics alluded to, see
Montgomery Slatkin’s “The Rate of Spread of an Advantageous Allele in a Subdivided
Population,” in S. Karlin and E. Nevo, eds., Population Genetics and Ecology (New York:
Academic Press, 1976), pp. ??–?, and his “Gene Flow and the Geographical Structure of
Natural Populations,” Science, ccxxxvi (1987): 787–92.
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the journal of philosophy12torily, privileged?17 One might view gene flow as the means through
which all other causes generate response (and thus integrative) cohe-
sion. This would be to view gene flow as a kind of causal bottleneck
through which other causes must pass if they are to generate integra-
tive cohesion, much as Richard Dawkins has argued that genes are
both developmental and evolutionary bottlenecks for evolutionary
stasis and change.18 We can depict this by modifying Figure 2 with
gene flow conceived as a mediating common cause of species cohesion:If Figure 3 captures the relationship between gene flow and other
factors that produce species cohesion, however, then it is very hard to
see a defensible rationale for privileging gene flow causally and ex-
planatorily, as (2) requires. Even supposing that gene flow is a genu-
ine bottleneck, something that empirical studies give us reason to
doubt, high levels of genotypic and phenotypic similarity is a further
such bottleneck, and one “closer” to species cohesion itself. If we pri-
vilege gene flow over putative initiating causes because it is a mediat-
ing common cause of species cohesion, then we should also privilege
genotypic and phenotypic similarity over gene flow. Conversely, if we
view gene flow as privileged over high levels of genotypic and pheno-
typic similarity in explaining species cohesion because it is what causes
that similarity, then, likewise, we should also privilege whatever initiat-
ing cause there was of gene flow, over gene flow itself. In effect, this first
option for privileging gene flow leads to another unsavory dilemma.
A second privileging option is to take gene flow not as a mediating
common cause but as the initiating cause in the chain that leadsVariable initiating causes, 
such as ecological 
regimes, selective forces
Gene 
flow
High levels of genotypic 
and phenotypic similarity
… …
Response 
species 
cohesion
Figure 3: Gene Flow as a Mediating Common Cause of Species Cohesion17 Such privileging can be quantitatively or qualitatively based. There are prima facie
problems with both. For example, how do you quantitatively compare the causal con-
tributions corresponding to selection coefficients that attach to traits, with measurements of
migration between populations? Proponents of The View tend to offer a qualitative basis
for their privileging of gene flow. For example, Morjan and Rieseberg highlight gene
flow’s quality of playing a distinctive “creative role” (op. cit., p. 1343) in generating
species cohesion. Unfortunately, the sense in which gene flow is said to play a distinc-
tively creative role is not clear. We cast doubt on the conceptual assumptions underlying
such qualitative privileging options.
18 Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (New York: Oxford, 1989, 2nd edition).
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cohesion 13eventually to species cohesion via diverse mediating causes, such as
developmental homeostasis and other forms of canalization:In Figure 4, gene flow is what “kicks off” a causal process that leads
(eventually) to species cohesion. The problem here is that even if
gene flow does sometimes play such an initiating causal role, on
The View it also clearly develops in response to just the kinds of
mediating causes listed in Figure 4. To capture this, the causal arrow
from gene flow to “downstream” mediating causes needs to be bi-
directional. For although gene flow might causally influence develop-
mental homeostasis, this homeostasis also causally restricts the set of
organisms that can reproduce and (thereby) realize gene flow.
In fact, by integrating both suggestions thus far considered, we
arrive at a more plausible view of how gene flow fits into the causal
nexus, one that takes us even further from (2):We believe that Figure 5 provides a more theoretically appropriate and
empirically adequate framework within which to think about the
causes of species cohesion. Thus, the privileging of gene flow in (2)
cannot be justified.
Might one concede that while gene flow is not a privileged cause of
species cohesion, nonetheless, a lack of gene flow explains why speciesGene 
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cally related to the one we have been discussing in a way that rules out
this option. To see this, consider an empirical example that has
helped show that gene flow is insufficient for species cohesion. Genes
have, as Templeton notes (op. cit., p. 166), flowed at significant rates
between balsam poplars and cottonwoods for hundreds of thousand
of years. Yet those species remain distinct because each has faced
different selection and ecological regimes. Thus, lack of gene flow
between species cannot be necessary for those species to each have
cohesion of their own: gene flow’s being insufficient for a possible
(broader) instance of species cohesion entails that lack of gene flow
is not necessary for distinct (narrower) instances of cohesion. To move
from this point about necessity, back to explanation: the prevalence of
interspecific hybridization in nature suggests that lack of gene flow is
not a privileged or general explanation (for example, one that fails
only in special cases) of distinct instances of species response cohesion.
In this and the previous section we have used a distinction between
integrative and response cohesion to articulate two problematic
claims that advocates of The View make regarding species cohesion.
The first is that the explanandum that stands in need of explanation is
species’ integrative cohesion. This claim is problematic because multi-
populational species are spatiotemporally gappy in a way that inhibits
the causal relations between conspecifics required for integrative co-
hesion. The second claim is that gene flow explains the integrative co-
hesion of species in virtue of its special causal influence on response
cohesion. This is problematic because attempts to accommodate the
recognition of the plurality of causes of response cohesion call into
question the explanatory cascade at the heart of The View that privi-
leges gene flow. For these reasons, we advocate rejection of The View.
v. broader implications for studying and thinking
about species
Finally, we turn to four implications of our discussion. Here we con-
structively suggest ways in which moving beyond The View, and draw-
ing explicitly on the distinction between response and integrative
cohesion, may lead to a richer future understanding of species, gene
flow, and cohesion.
V.1. Evolutionary Forces. In their discussion of the “connectivity
among marine populations” that we drew on above, Hellberg and
his colleagues have two broad goals: to illuminate the complexity of
evolving marine populations and to offer prescriptions for dealing
with this complexity. In meeting the first of these goals, they show
how new DNA sequencing methodologies suggest that populationsMaster Proof JOP 405
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plexly interacting evolutionary forces (for example, drift, gene flow,
mutation, selection, and history) than population geneticists—such
as themselves—have previously thought. As a result, old theoretical
models and assumptions need to be updated, new methodologies
developed, and greater interdisciplinary collaboration fostered. For
instance, Hellberg’s group notes that selection and history are espe-
cially difficult causes of species cohesion to study and thus “future
genetic surveys should include more detailed spatial and temporal
sampling and employ analyses of DNA sequence data that can reveal
the signatures of natural selection and historical changes” (op. cit.,
p. 273). Such methodologies will require population geneticists, ecolo-
gists, and phylogeneticists of various sorts to work more closely than they
have, with the hope being that richer patterns of explanation emerge.
Our discussion strengthens these sorts of prescriptions, especially
by bringing conceptual clarity to (c) through the distinction between
integrative and response cohesion. This, in turn, motivates new and
more integrated methodologies, explanatory patterns, and disciplin-
ary relationships that better capture the complexities we highlighted.
Reconceiving the role of gene flow in creating and maintaining spe-
cies cohesion along the lines suggested by Figure 5 is part of what is
needed here. But it is also now clear that we need a richer set of con-
ceptual tools for thinking about the complex interactions between
various causes and how to measure their effects. One way in which
philosophers might further contribute here is to tease apart the epi-
stemic from the metaphysical challenges that complicate attempts to
study evolutionary forces.19
V.2. Species as Evolutionary Units. Consider now the popular ideas that
species are “evolutionary units” and have a reality that higher taxa
lack.20 The first idea’s popularity is unsurprising in light of the influ-
ence of the view that species are cohesive: species are evolutionary
units in that they have cohesion. And the distinctive ontological status
of species sub-species taxa amongst Linnaean taxa is even presup-
posed by phylogeneticists who wish to abandon, except for species, the
Linnaean hierarchy in favor of the rank-free Phylocode.21 This is19 The notion of entwinement introduced in the context of the levels of selection may
prove useful here. See Wilson, “Pluralism, Entwinement, and the Levels of Selection,”
Philosophy of Science, lxx (2003): 531–52, and his Genes and the Agents of Life: The Individ-
ual in the Fragile Sciences: Biology (New York: Cambridge, 2005), chapter 10.
20 For example, see Ereshefsky, “Species, Higher Taxa, and the Units of Evolution,”
Philosophy of Science, lviii (1991): 84–101; Hull, “Are Species Really Individuals?,”
Systematic Zoology, xxv (1976): 174–91.
21 A good example of such a phylogeneticist is de Queiroz, op. cit.
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sion, the evolutionary unity, that species display.
However, despite its popularity, “evolutionary unit” has remained
notoriously vague. We think this is partially because of inadequate
attention to species cohesion. Rightly, some authors have recently
demanded that “evolutionary unit” be clarified and its putative role
in taxonomic views subsequently justified.22 Our discussion of species
cohesion begins providing clarification. It suggests that the evolution-
ary unity of a typical species consists in response cohesion, not inte-
grative cohesion. More precisely, to be an evolutionary unit is to be an
entity that has response cohesion with respect to evolutionary pres-
sures such as selection, drift, and migration, that is, to be composed
of parts or members that respond, or are disposed to respond, as a
unit to selection, drift, migration, and so on. This leaves open the
possibility (which other facts may or may not close off) that taxa other
than species are evolutionary units: nothing in their nature rules out
their having response cohesion with respect to evolutionary pressures.
Of course, response cohesion comes in degrees or grades. But this
may explain away the common idea that taxa above the rank of spe-
cies are not evolutionary units: those taxa often have response cohe-
sion with respect to evolutionary pressures, but to a lesser degree than
do species. Taxa below the species rank, such as demes, may have a
higher degree or grade of this response cohesion. Importantly, these
points alone do not license the claim that higher taxa are unreal or
less real. This is a further issue, and we see no prima facie reason to
think differences in degree or grade of response cohesion are onto-
logically decisive here.
A related issue, perhaps of more taxonomic interest, is whether
taxonomists choose arbitrarily when choosing which of the real differ-
ences between grades of response cohesion are the ones that mark
distinctions between ranks. Even if these choices are largely arbitrary,
species may be one of many sorts of taxa that have real response co-
hesion with respect to evolutionary pressures. The distinctness of spe-
cies in particular—their nature—consists in part (and only in part) in
having a particular degree or grade of such cohesion.
V.3. Species Ontology. These initial clarifications of “evolutionary unit”
throw light on the related ontological thesis that species are individ-
uals. Hull’s influential version of this thesis implied that species are
individuals, in a “strict” sense of that term, because they are evolutionary22 Joel Velasco makes this demand persuasively in Philosophy and the Tree of Life: The
Metaphysics and Epistemology of Phylogenetic Systematics (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of
Wisconsin, Madison, 2008).
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tially discontinuous nations such as the U.S.A. can satisfy. Minimal and
distinguishing requirements for individuality in the strict sense are
unity and continuity (ibid., p. 93) and, according to Hull, “[s]pecies
as evolutionary units fulfill the strict requirements. They are ‘individ-
uals’ in the same sense that organisms are individuals” (ibid., p. 93).
Despite this view’s popularity, some authors have found it too strong.24
We can now put this worry simply and forcefully. For X to be an indi-
vidual in the strict sense is at least in part for it to be in X’s nature to
have integrative cohesion. Indeed, if we use paradigm individuals such
as organisms as our guide, individuality requires integrative cohesion
of a high degree. In any case, Hull’s thesis is false because species
typically do not have integrative cohesion. And when they do, this is
contingent, not in their nature: it is a property they could lose while
remaining species. Perhaps a particular degree or grade of response
cohesion characterizes species as evolutionary units. Yet this is insuffi-
cient for individuality (in Hull’s strict sense).
These comments are compatible with the softening of the individ-
uality thesis that is sometimes expressed by saying that species are
“historical entities.” But this idea cries out for metaphysical develop-
ment. We think it is best developed as part of the homeostatic property
cluster (HPC) view of natural kinds.25 We will not dwell on this claim
here, except to bring out one feature of the HPC view that our discus-
sion highlights.
The HPC view implies that apparently disjunctive properties
(including historical, reproductive and other relational properties)
that define kinds of entities are often coinstantiated. Shared causal
mechanisms underwrite their coinstantiation and because of this they
form definitive property clusters that are homeostatic. Individuative
and explanatory practices in numerous scientific disciplines motivate
this suggestion. The rejection of (2), and so The View, in favor of a23 Hull, “The Ontological Status of Species as Evolutionary Units,” in R.E. Butts and
J. Hintikka, eds., Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences (Boston: Reidel, 1977),
pp. 91–102.
24 Examples are Kim Sterelny, “The Nature of Species,” Philosophical Books, xxxv
(1994): 9–20, and Wilson, “Realism, Essence, and Kind: Resuscitating Species Essen-
tialism?,” in Wilson, ed., op. cit.
25 For different expressions of the view that species are HPC kinds, see Richard Boyd,
“Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa,” in Wilson, ed., op. cit., and in the same vol-
ume, Griffith’s “Squaring the Circle: Natural Kinds with Historical Essences,” and
Wilson’s “Realism, Essence, and Kind: Resuscitating Species Essentialism?” For a recent
discussion that responds to some critiques of the HPC view, see Wilson, Barker, and
Ingo Brigandt, “When Traditional Essentialism Fails: Biological Natural Kinds,” Philo-
sophical Topics in press.
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stood, can lead eventually to response cohesion in species supports
(and is supported by) the HPC view of natural kinds. Conspecific
populations are responsively cohesive, and the nexus of causal factors,
including gene flow, that create and sustain that cohesion makes these
populations very much like the natural kinds articulated by the HPC
view. (Indeed, one might simply identify some such populations with
species taxa.)
V.4. The Species Problem. Finally, consider the classic problem of
defining “species,” beginning with the biological species concept (BSC).
All reproductive definitions of “species” are variations on the BSC,
which holds that species are “groups of interbreeding natural popu-
lations that are reproductively isolated from other such groups.”26
Immediately after this restatement of the BSC, Mayr says that a
“species is a protected gene pool … a Mendelian population that
has it own devices (called isolating mechanisms) to protect it from
harmful gene flow from other gene pools” (ibid., p. 13). Given this, it
would be natural to paraphrase “interbreeding natural populations” as
“populations between which there is gene flow.” Yet there is a problem
with this way of conceptualizing what a species is that is readily ex-
pressible in terms of response and integrative cohesion.
Species of organism are characterized by a degree or grade of re-
sponse cohesion, and it is when this response cohesion breaks down
radically, for some reason, that we change the number of species.
Either there is a speciation event (more accurately, perhaps, a process),
an extinction event, or a blending of distinct species. Some species may
have, in addition, a contingent and weakened sort of integrative cohe-
sion, and some subset of those species have such integrative cohesion in
virtue of gene flow between their constituent populations. But gene
flow is simply one mechanism amongst many for generating both
response and (if and where it exists) integrative cohesion; it should
not be the only part of the definition of what a species is. In effect, this
is one way tomotivate both liberalizations of (for example, Templeton’s
cohesion species concept) and alternatives to (for example, Wiley’s
evolutionary species concept) the BSC. Although we have no allegiance
to any of these, we can end by gesturing in a direction that the above-
mentioned HPC view opens up.
Aficionados of recent discussions of “the species problem” may
point out that our distinction between response and integrative cohe-
sion, and our discussion of the many causes of cohesion, fits nicely26 Mayr, Populations, Species, and Evolution (Cambridge: Harvard, 1970), at p. 12.
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and Philip Kitcher see the many different species concepts that com-
pete in the literature, and the many causes of species cohesion that in
part underwrite this variety, as evidence for there being no unified
species category.27 On such views, “species” is an ambiguous term that
refers to different kinds of things, studied by different branches of
biology. But alternatively, if response cohesion in species and the com-
plex causal nexus that gives rise to it supports something like an HPC
kind individuated by causally related mechanisms—such as gene flow,
selection, and history—then there is reason for hypothesizing that the
species category is an HPC kind rather than a disjunction of wholly
distinct kinds. Being a species may partly involve being held together
by the mechanistically coinstantiated causes of response species cohe-
sion we have discussed. This would motivate synthesis of pluralistic
and monistic views of species, but we leave further pursuit of that sug-
gestion for another time.
matthew j. barker
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robert a. wilson
University of Alberta27 For Dupré’s pluralism, see his The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the
Disunity of Science (Cambridge: Harvard, 1993); for Kitcher’s, see “Species,” Philosophy of
Science, li (1984): 308–33.
Master Proof JOP 405
